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Abstract 
 
This paper focuses on the final passage of Metaphysics Λ 4, which contains the first explicit 
mention of the unmoved mover in book Λ. The sentence is crucial for the problem of what, if 
anything, the Aristotelian god knows about the world. The author starts with a general enumeration 
of the main interpretations of the problem of the omniscience of god, which either admit a divine 
activity upon the world (Alexander of Aphrodisias, Thomas Aquinas), or that, by thinking himself, 
god thinks everything (Thomas Aquinas) or that, in knowing himself, he knows beings (Averroës), 
or, finally, state that god knows only himself (Schwegler, Bonitz, Zeller, Ross and many others). In 
this section the importance of Metaphysics Λ 9 has been stressed, which constitutes the only 
complete text on the topic which has come down to us, and where Aristotle, as it is well known, 
denies that god has knowledge of the world. Λ 9 is, therefore, an essential and necessary 
reference for any other passage which contains a mention of the matter in question. In the 
following section, the paper analyzes the context in which the final passage of Λ 4 is inserted. The 
attempt is to show that the reference to the unmoved movers in Λ 4 is not introduced abruptly, but 
rather that it fits perfectly in the discussion of the chapter. The third section contains the analysis of 
the passage. In particular, the suggestion proposed by R. George is considered, who, after having 
recalled F. Brentano’s position, asserts that the sentence would imply that the first of all things 
contains within itself the formal principle of what it brings forth, and that, since the first mover 
moves all things, it actually is all things.  This paper aims to show that the first cause of all things, 
whose mention follows the enumeration of the four causes – matter, form and privation as 
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immanent elements, and the moving cause of natural substance as external principle –, is not 
within the coincidence of formal and moving cause. Therefore the case of the proximate moving 
cause (for example the builder), which knows its effect (for example the form of the house), 
appears as different from the case of the first remote moving cause which moves all things, which 
does not seem to have knowledge of the world. This paper suggests that the coincidence between 
the formal and the moving cause may only work for natural substances and, therefore, for the 
moving cause in the weaker sense, while it does not apply to the remote moving cause. In this 
perspective the fact that the Aristotelian god cannot be a formal cause plays a fundamental role, 
being an external and separated principle. Consequently, the role of the mention of the unmoved 
mover in the final passage of Λ 4 does not appear as a reference which is completely detached 
from the rest of the text, but it seems to perfectly fit in it and indeed appears to play a central role in 
the entire chapter. 
  
Key-words: unmoved mover; moving cause; formal cause; thinking of thinking; knowledge; world. 
 
Text of the paper 
 
1. Introduction  
As is well known, the problem of Aristotle’s first unmoved mover as thinking of thinking is 
mainly dealt with in the ninth chapter of Metaphysics Λ. The text takes a precise position in order to 
answer the question of what, if anything, Aristotle’s prime mover knows about the world: if god only 
thinks himself, any other object of thought appears excluded from him. Since Metaph. Λ 9 contains 
the most complete exposition of the problem, it should be considered as the base of Aristotle’s 
doctrine in question, and as the text with which scholars who deal with the issue should commit 
themselves1. The clear and proven description of the unmoved mover as thinking of thinking stated 
there, prevents us from attributing any knowledge other than himself to the Aristotelian god. It is, 
                                                          
1 I dealt with Aristotle’s analysis of the unmoved mover as thinking of thinking in Metaphysics Λ 9 in R. Salis, 
,“Aristotele, Metafisica Λ 9: il motore immobile come pensiero di pensiero”, in G. Piaia e G. Zago, (a cura), 
Pensiero e formazione. Studi in onore di Giuseppe Micheli, Cleup, Padova, 2016, 143-156. 
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however, equally known that in other works of the Corpus Aristotelicum we can find a large number 
of passages from which it is possible to draw elements in favour of the opposite thesis, according 
to which Aristotle admits a relation between god and world. For example, in Metaph. A 2 Aristotle 
defines wisdom as science that investigates the first principles and causes2, and affirms that such 
a science either god alone can have, or god above all others3. The assignment of the knowledge of 
the causes of existing things to god makes the passage inconsistent with Metaph. Λ 9, unless, as 
with Ross, we maintain that Aristotle, in Metaph. A 2 «is speaking of God4 as commonly 
conceived»5. Perhaps we can put forward the same explanation about the passage in Eth. Nic. X 
9, where Aristotle reports that gods are thought to have care for human affairs6, and about the 
assertion in Eth. Eud. VIII 2, according to which the lucky seems to succeed owing to god7. At any 
rate, these, and a large number of other passages, impose an accurate analysis of the context in 
which they are inserted, and the risk of coming to a total incompatibility with the main Aristotelian 
exposition of the doctrine of the unmoved mover as thinking of thinking exposed in Metaph. Λ 9 
arises.   
Among one of the most difficult passages that requires particular attention, let us consider 
the final passage of Metaph. Λ 4, where Aristotle states that, besides the causes just considered, 
as we will see, there is something further, i.e. that which, as the first of all things, moves all things. 
The sentence was taken into account by the commentary tradition in order to contribute towards 
giving a possible answer to the problem of what Aristotle’s god knows about the world8. Alexander 
of Aphrodisias, the Exegete κατ’ ἐξοχήν, dealing in Quaest. 2.3 with θεία δύναμις, concedes that 
the divine power exerts a providential influence on the causes of earthly matters and especially on 
                                                          
2 Cf. Aristot. Metaph. Α 2, 982 b 9-10. 
3 Cf. Aristot. Metaph. Α 3, 983 a 9-10. 
4 Cf. infra, n. 17. 
5 Cf. W. D. Ross, Aristotle’s Metaphysics. A Revised Text with Introduction and Commentary, vol. II, Reprint 
Sandpiper Books, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1997, 123.  
6 Cf. Aristot. Eth. Nic. X 9, 1179 a 24-25. 
7 Cf. Aristot. Eth. Eud. VIII 2, 1248 b 4. 
8 For a history of the problem of the activity of Aristotelian god see K. Elser, Lehre des Aristoteles über das 
Wirken Gottes, Ascendorff, Münster i. W., 1893, 19-31. 
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the origin of psychicality9. Paul Moraux supposed that the Quaestio was part of Alexander’s 
response to Atticus’ charges that Aristotle, despite having recognized nature as a principle, did not 
identify it with the world-soul, as Plato did, and that he destroyed the unity of the universe and 
denied providence by adopting different principles for the heavens and the sublunary world10. But 
what Alexander says in our Quaestio goes beyond the position he assumed in his commentaries 
on Aristotle’s works. In particular, in his commentary on Metaphysics he just follows Aristotle in De 
Generatione et Corruptione II.10, saying that nature is called a divine art not in the sense that god 
is employing this art, but because, being a power from god, it is capable of preserving the right 
order of movement, because it is from the gods11.  
Thomas Aquinas, on the other hand, maintained that Aristotle’s god, by thinking himself, 
thinks everything12, and held that Aristotle conceived of god as exercising a providential action 
upon the world, also leading the Aristotelian doctrine of causality back to the divine providence13. 
By contrast, in his commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics Λ, Averroës asserts that god’s 
knowledge is different from ours and therefore his knowledge can neither be described as 
universal, nor as particular, but, at the same time, he doesn’t want to claim that god is ignorant of 
things of the world. Therefore, Averroës’ solution is to say that, by knowing himself, god knows 
                                                          
9 Cf. Alexandri Aphrodisiensis praeter Commentaria Scripta Minora: Quaestiones, edidit I. Bruns, Reimer, 
Berolini, 1892 (CAG 2 Suppl.), 47. 33-50, 27 (cf. Alexander of Aphrodisias, Quaestiones 1.1-2.15, transl. by 
R. W. Sharples, Duckworth, London, 1992, ad loc.). Cf. also Alexandri Aphrodisiensis in Aristotelis 
Meteorologicorum libros Commentaria, edidit M. Hayduck, Reimer, Berolini, 1899 (CAG 3.2), 7. 9-14. See P. 
Donini, “Θεία δύναμις in Alessandro di Afrodisia”, in M. Bonazzi, (ed), Commentary and Tradition. 
Aristotelianism, Platonism, and Post-Hellenistic Philosophy, De Gruyter, Berlin - New York, 2011, 125-138.  
10 Cf. P. Moraux, “Alexander von Aphrodisias Quaest. 2.3”, Hermes, 95 (1967), 159-169; id., Der 
Aristotelismus bei den Griechen von Andronikos bis Alexander von Aphrodisias, Bd. II: Der Aristotelismus im 
I. und II. Jh. n. Chr., De Gruyter, Berlin - New York, 1984, 45-47. Cf. Atticus, frr. 8.3, 66, 17-19; 8.4, 67, 25-
26 des Places.  
11 Cf. Alexandri Aphrodisiensis in Aristotelis Metaphysica Commentaria, edidit M. Hayduck, Reimer, Berolini, 
1891 (CAG 1), 104. 7-10. 
12 Cf. S. Thomae Aquinatis In duodecim libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis Expositio, editio iam M. R. Cathala 
et R. M. Spiazzi, Marietti, Taurini - Romae, 1964, L. XII, l. XI, n° 2614: Nec tamen sequitur quod omnia alia a 
se sint ei ignota; nam intelligendo se, intelligit omnia alia. 
13 Cf. Thom. in Metaph., L. VI, l. III, n° 1222. 
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beings through the existence which is the cause of their existence14. Finally, the most common 
view still denies that the Aristotelian god knows something other than himself. Since Aristotle’s god 
is thinking of thinking, he only knows himself and nothing of the world. This point of view has been 
supported, for example, by Schwegler, Bonitz, Zeller, Ross, Cherniss, Oehler and many others. 
The Aristotelian passage we are going to examine has recently been taken into account by 
Rolf George15, who has paid attention to a reading of the last sentence of Metaph. Λ 4, suggested 
by Franz Brentano in his Psychologie des Aristoteles16. The analysis of our passage leads George 
to conclude that, according to Aristotle, in god17 moving and formal cause coincide so that not only 
does Aristotle’s god know the world, but, in that he knows all things, he is all things. In the final 
passage of Metaph. Λ 4, George finds an analogous of the section in Metaph. Α 2, where Aristotle, 
saying that «knowing all things must belong to him who has universal knowledge in the highest 
degree», and that «such a science either god alone can have, or god above all others»18, would 
state that god is all things19.  
 
2. The Context  
After having started his research on the principles of substance, announced in ch. 1 as the 
aim of the book, showing that the causes and the principles are three – form, matter and privation 
– (ch. 2), then adding the moving cause and showing that neither the proximate matter nor the 
form comes to be (ch. 3), Aristotle establishes that the causes and principles are, in a sense, 
                                                          
14 Cf. Averroès, Grand commentaire de la Métaphysique d’Aristote (Tafsīr ma ba‘d at-tabi‘at). Livre Lam-
Lambda traduit de l’arabe et annoté, texte arabe inedit etabli par M. Bouyges, vol. III: Livres Ya’ et Lam et 
index alphabetiques des trois volumes, Imprimerie catholique Paris, Beirouth, 1948, 1707-1708 (transl. C. 
Genequand, in Ibn Rushd’s Metaphysics. A Translation with Introduction of Ibn Rush’s Commentary on 
Aristotle’s Metaphysics, Book Lām, Brill, Leiden, 1986, ad loc.). See T.-A. Druart, “Averroes on God’s 
Knowledge of Being Qua Being”, Anaquel de Estudios Árabes, 4 (1993), 39-57. 
15 Cf. R. George, “An Argument for Divine Omniscience in Aristotle”, Apeiron, 22 (1989), 61-74.  
16 F. Brentano, Die Psychologie des Aristoteles inbesondere seine Lehre vom ΝΟΥΣ ΠΟΙΗΤΙΚΟΣ, 
Kirchheim, Mainz, 1867. 
17 Unlike George and many others scholars, who capitalize ‘God’, I prefer to translate the greek term θεός 
with the small letter, to avoid confusion between Aristotle’s god and other conception of the divine, first of all 
the Christian God.  
18 Cf. Aristot. Metaph. Α 2, 982 a 22-983 a 9. 
19 Cf. George, “An Argument for Divine Omniscience in Aristotle”, 63-64. 
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different for the different things, but that, in another sense, if we speak universally and analogically, 
they are the same for all things (ch. 4).  
Michel Crubellier emphasizes that the question of the identity or diversity of the first 
principles is crucial for the very possibility of a first philosophy, and emphasizes the similarity with 
the aporiai of Metaphysics Β. The lack of a reference in Λ 4 to the aporiai of Β is explained by 
Crubellier with the reminder of the fact that the discussions in Β usually presuppose that there is in 
fact an identity of principles, so that the question in Λ 4 appears more basic. According to 
Crubellier, in Λ 4 Aristotle would be objecting to the Platonic view that there can be one science 
able to grasp the principles of all existing things and all possible knowledge, for this kind of solution 
would clash with Aristotle’s thesis of the plurality of being20.  These observations are very important 
to verify the role of the final passage in Λ 4 and its meaning in the wider context of the object of the 
divine thought. The different form of identity of principles can appear pointless in comparison with 
the stronger form of identity given by the first mover21. Therefore, seeing which kind of relation 
subsists between the different kinds of identity of principles, in particular those analyzed in Λ 4, 
may help us answer our question. Let us now examine the text. 
The thesis that causes and principles are individually different but analogically the same, will 
be proved through a dialectical inquiry, and is placed, as usual, at the beginning of the chapter. 
The thesis is firstly shown referring to the elements, i.e. referring to the immanent principles of 
things. Aristotle rewrites the sentence in a more restricted way and asserts that one might raise the 
question whether the principles and elements are different or the same for substances and for 
relatives22, and in a similar way in the case of each of the other categories. The thesis is refuted by 
two arguments. (1) The first one says that, if the elements were the same for all things, then from 
the same elements will proceed relatives and substances. But, since the element is prior to the 
                                                          
20 Cf. M. Crubellier, “Metaphysics Λ 4”, in M. Frede and D. Charles, (eds), Aristotle’s Metaphysics Lambda. 
Symposium Aristotelicum, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 2000, 137-160, exp. 138.  
21 Cf. Crubellier, “Metaphysics Λ 4”, 141.  
22 I think we should agree with Crubellier, who asserts that the choice of pair ‘substance + relative’ may be 
explained by the fact that πρός τι is the remotest category from substance. See Crubellier, “Metaphysics Λ 
4”, 145 n. 14. 
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thing of which it is an element, the common element should be prior to the categories. 
Nevertheless, the substance and the other categories are the supreme genres of the being, thus 
nothing can exist prior to them. The conclusion is therefore that the common element were one of 
the categories but, says Aristotle, «substance is not an element of relatives, nor is any of these an 
element of substance»23. (2) Furthermore, all things cannot have the same elements for none of 
the elements can be the same as the thing which is composed of the elements. If so, indeed, none 
of the elements would be either a substance or a relative, but it must be one or other of the 
categories. (2a) Aristotle refers briefly to intelligibles, e.g. ‘one’ and ‘being’: none of them can be the 
common element for they are predicable of each of the compounds as well, and the elements 
cannot be identical with the compound of which they are elements24. This incidental reference to 
intelligibles seems to mean that, for them, what has been described for the sensible objects 
applies, so that they incur in the same refutation: if ‘one’ and ‘being’ can be predicated of any 
object, they cannot be the elements of things. This point may confirm the Aristotelian polemic 
against the Platonic doctrine of the principle according to which the first principles are ‘elements’, 
and may advise us that Aristotle’s aim is not to stand to any physical doctrine25. His purpose in ch. 
4 appears to anticipate, as in a compendium, the result of the research on the substance, 
announced in ch. 1 as the aim of the whole book and which finds its ultimate step in the brief 
reference to the first mover in the final passage, which is also his first explicit mention in book Λ. 
Aristotle goes on to show that the elements are analogically the same through three 
examples which refer to the genesis of sensible, material objects (τῶν αἰσθητῶν σωμάτων)26. 
Nevertheless, he considers items which do not immediately seem to refer to sensible substances: 
in the case of the elements of perceptible bodies, we can distinguish, as form, the hot, and in 
another sense, as privation, the cold; and, as matter, that which in virtue of itself, and not of a 
                                                          
23 Cf. Aristot. Metaph. Λ 4, 1070 a 33-b 4.  
24 Cf. Aristot. Metaph. Λ 4, 1070 b 4-10. 
25 Cf. Crubellier, “Metaphysics Λ 4”, 147-148. 
26 Cf. Aristot. Metaph. Λ 4, 1070 b 11.  
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concomitant27, is potentially hot and cold. But in the next sentence Aristotle points out that both 
these, the principles (i.e. matter, form and privation) and the things which are composed of these 
(prime matter, a certain form, e.g. heat, the privation of the form, e.g. cold)28, and of which these 
are the principles, are substances. Aristotle’s clarification appears less applicable to the privation, 
but it is possible to explain the references to ‘hot’ and ‘cold’ as a dialectical hypothesis29. Be that as 
it may, the example does not constitute a problem for the understanding of the passage. Aristotle 
gives the example of the unity which is produced out of the hot and cold, e.g. flesh or bone, 
because the product must be different from the element. Therefore, the principles and the 
elements of different things are analogically the same; i.e. one might say that there are three 
principles – the form, the privation and the matter –, but they are different in the different things. 
Two other examples follow: Aristotle reports that, in colour, white is form, black is privation and 
surface is matter, and that in the case of day and night, light is form, darkness is privation and air is 
matter30. 
After having dealt with the immanent elements, Aristotle adds the external (ἐκτός) principle, 
i.e. the moving cause. The term ‘element’, indeed, here does not have the usual meaning of «that 
into which a thing is divided and which is present in it as matter»31, stated in Metaphysics Ζ 17, but 
it is equivalent to the ‘inner’ principles, as opposed to the external one, i.e. the moving cause which 
acts from outside32. As Crubellier notes, this special use of στοιχεῖον cannot be found in any other 
part of the Aristotelian Corpus. He stresses that the use of the term is an ad hoc conceptual 
device, by which Aristotle would reshape Plato’s doctrines in order to refute them with more 
efficacy33, but we can also recognize another function in Aristotle’s calling ‘element’ form, matter 
                                                          
27 Cf. Ross, Aristotle’s Metaphysics, 360. 
28 Cf. ibid.  
29 Cf. Crubellier, “Metaphysics Λ 4”, 150. 
30 Cf. Aristot. Metaph. Λ 4, 1070 b 10-21. 
31 Aristot. Metaph. Z 17, 1041 b 31-32 (transl. W. D. Ross, in J. Barnes, (ed), The Complete Works of 
Aristotle. The Revised Oxford Translation, vol. II, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1985, 
ad loc.). 
32 Cf. Crubellier, “Metaphysics Λ 4”, 144. 
33 Cf. ibid. 
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and privation. The necessity of the introduction of a fourth principle is indeed also due to the 
insufficiency of the immanent principle to explain the reality. The necessity to introduce an external 
cause to explain the process of coming-to-be determines the introduction of the distinction between 
‘principle’ (ἀρχή) and ‘element’ (στοιχεῖον). Both are causes, i.e. both are required for the 
explanation of coming-to-be, but the moving cause, as it is something external, is a principle too, 
but not an element34.   
The next step in Aristotle’s argumentation consists of the application of the doctrine of the 
analogy of causes and principles, and their individual differences, to the external principle. The 
result is that analogically there are three elements – matter, form and privation – and four causes 
and principles, as the moving cause is a cause and a principle, but not an element, while the three 
elements are different in the different things and the primary (πρῶτον) moving cause is different for 
different things. Aristotle explains the point saying that regarding health, disease and body, the 
moving cause is the medical art, and if we take form, disorder of a particular kind and bricks, the 
moving cause is the building art35. Aristotle states that, in the chain of moving causes which 
produce an event, there must be a beginning, i.e. a ‘first moving cause’ from which the process of 
moving causality starts and which conveys a form, as we are going to see. In the final passage 
Aristotle mentions the second kind of first mover, i.e. the first unmoved mover. Nevertheless, as we 
will see later, the reference to the primary moving cause in 1070 b 27 does not include the first 
moving cause which moves all things, whose existence has yet to be proved36.  
 
3. The Text 
The introduction of the external cause, due, as we have detailed above, to the insufficiency 
of the internal principles in order to explain the natural world, also suggests the idea that, for there 
is only one principle which is not an element, i.e. the moving cause, there may be some principle 
                                                          
34 Cf. Aristot. Metaph. Λ 4, 1070 b 22-25. 
35 Cf. Aristot. Metaph. Λ 4, 1070 b 25-29. 
36 On this point I disagree with Crubellier, “Metaphysics Λ 4”, 153, who thinks that the passage considers 
both kinds of first mover.  
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common to all things, which cannot be an element. And since the unique cause with this feature is 
the first unmoved mover, the correct description of the first principle has to be ‘cause’ and not 
‘element’37. As we have just seen above regarding Aristotle’s reference to intelligibles38, the 
distinction of different kinds of principles works to clarify Aristotle’s aim in Λ 4, i.e. to show, in 
contrast to Plato, that there is a principle, common to all things, which is not an element but a 
cause. Since the moving cause, being an external principle, is free from the limitations imposed by 
the theory of the equivocity of being, the principles conceived as elements, being a material 
constituent part or a universal term in the notion of the object, cannot be common to all things. One 
and the same moving cause, indeed, may produce several effects in a series of objects, and, 
similarly, a moving cause could be the cause of all things, granting the unity of the whole world39. 
We have to agree with Crubellier, when he says that, for this reason, Aristotle has to show that the 
moving cause is a principle40. And the same necessity to find a starting point in the series of the 
causes appears to justify the mention of the primary moving cause, which is the beginning of the 
process of causality. But, for Aristotle, things are different, and the peculiarity of everything is given 
precisely by its form, which indeed is ‘what makes a thing what it actually is’. This is the crucial 
point for my argument: if what happens in the case of natural things also happens in the case of 
the moving cause which ‘as first of all things, moves all things’, this may give us a very strong 
argument in favour of the omniscience of the Aristotelian unmoved movers. But let us verify this 
suggestion by analyzing our text. The passage which immediately precedes the final sentence of Λ 
4 is the following: 
ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ κινοῦν ἐν μὲν τοῖς φυσικοῖς ἀνθρώπῳ ἄνθρωπος, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἀπὸ διανοίας τὸ εἶδος ἢ 
τὸ ἐναντίον, τρόπον τινὰ τρία αἴτια ἂν εἴη, ὡδὶ δὲ τέτταρα. ὑγίεια γάρ πως ἡ ἰατρική, καὶ οἰκίας 
εἶδος ἡ οἰκοδομική, καὶ ἄνθρωπος ἄνθρωπον γεννᾷ. 
 
                                                          
37 Cf. Crubellier, “Metaphysics Λ 4”, 142. 
38 Cf. Aristot. Metaph. Λ 4, 1070 b 7-10. 
39 Cf. Crubellier, “Metaphysics Λ 4”, 152-153. 
40 Cf. Crubellier, “Metaphysics Λ 4”, 153. 
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And since the moving cause in the case of natural things is, for man, for instance, man, and in 
the products of thought it is the form or its contrary, there are in a sense three causes, while in 
a sense there are four. For the medical art is in some sense health, and the building art is the 
form of the house, and man begets man41. 
 
The sentence still concerns the moving cause of natural substances. Aristotle states that 
there is a sense in which the moving cause coincides with the form. As Aristotle has shown in Λ 3, 
just as the moving cause is, for example, man for natural substances, so is the moving cause the 
form, or its opposite, for products of thought42. Therefore, only since the moving cause is in some 
sense the form, in a sense there are three causes, but since the causes remains different, the 
causes are four. So, if we take the case of health and of the form of the house cited above43, in 
some sense the medical art is health, and the building art is the form of the house. Crubellier is 
absolutely right in recalling Phys. II 7, where Aristotle, in a similar way, states that the four causes 
may be reduced to two, the form often being identical with the end, and the moving cause 
specifically identical with the mover, since they have the same form44. Nevertheless, Aristotle’s aim 
here does not seem to show that one may come to ignore the mover, as Crubellier thinks45, but the 
sentence may imply that the moving cause, e.g. the medical art, being specifically identical with the 
form, i.e. with ‘what makes a thing what it actually is’, also knows the object which it produces. 
Aristotle seems therefore to point out that, concerning natural substances, their external cause is, 
in a sense, the same as their form, since the two causes are specifically identical, having the same 
form. But from this it follows that between moving cause and form there is also a relation of 
knowledge, in the sense that the moving cause, in qua form of its product, also knows it. This is the 
case of the moving cause of natural substances: the medical art belongs to the doctor who knows 
health, just as the building art belongs to the builder who knows the form of the house. Aristotle’s 
                                                          
41 Aristot. Metaph. Λ 4, 1070 b 30-34. (transl. Ross, with some few changes).  
42 Aristot. Metaph. Λ 3, 1070 a 4-9. 
43 Aristot. Metaph. Λ 4, 1070 b  28-29. 
44 Cf. Aristot. Phys. II 7, 198 a 22-35. Cf. Crubellier, “Metaphysics Λ 4”, 156. 
45 Cf. Crubellier, “Metaphysics Λ 4”, 156. 
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discussion would therefore mean that the specific identity between moving cause and form implies 
that the moving cause has knowledge of the form of its product.       
  Actually, a similar interpretation is justified by Phys. II 7. The passage quoted by Crubellier 
states, indeed, that the form, the mover and the end often coincide, for the essence and the end 
are one, and the primary source of motion is the same as these in species. However, Aristotle says 
that this does not happen ‘always’, but ‘often’, and the exception is actually given by the things 
which are not the kind of things that move by being moved. Things that are not of this kind are no 
longer inside the province of physics, since they produce movement without being moved 
themselves, and so these belongs to a different branch of study46. 
In this perspective the mention of the first cause which moves all things does not appear to 
be introduced abruptly. Rather the first introduction of the unmoved mover in book Λ appears to 
refer to the remote moving cause. The passage (with Bonitz’s conjecture, τὸ ὡς for ὡς τό) is the 
following: 
 
ἔτι παρὰ ταῦτα τὸ ὡς πρῶτον πάντων κινοῦν πάντα. 
          Further, besides these there is that which as first of all things moves all things47. 
 
Elders suggests that Aristotle seems to intimate that the causality of the first mover of all 
things is of a different class, and that it appears to introduce the theme of the next chapter48, but 
we have to agree with George in noting that the first mover is not the theme of Λ 549. According to 
P. Aubenque, then, the final passage would be a later addition50. A continuation of the list of the 
causes and a disanalogy with the other cases was by contrast admitted by Alexander of 
Aphrodisias, whose analysis we can read in Averroës. Alexander maintains that the last sentence 
                                                          
46 Cf. Aristot. Phys. II 7, 198 a 24-31. 
47 Aristot. Metaph. Λ 4, 1070 b 34-35. 
48 Cf. L. Elders, Aristotle’s Theology. A Commentary on Book Λ of the Metaphysics, Van Gorcum, Assen, 
1972, 121-122. 
49 Cf. George, “An Argument for Divine Omniscience in Aristotle”, 67. 
50 Cf. P. Aubenque, Le problème de l’être chez Aristote. Essai sur la problématique aristotelèlicienne, PUF, 
Paris, 2013 (6th ed), 398. 
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of chapter 4 was added to make it known that there is another principle, distinct from movable 
things, which is common to all movable. Insofar as it is common, this principle would not have to be 
synonymous, since it is common and ultimate51. Therefore, according to Alexander, god, contrary 
to the other causes, moves the world non-synonymously, and he does not contain within himself 
the formal principle of his effects. George objects to this point that whether an agent has brought 
about one thing or many depends on one’s point of view. He explains that in designing the house 
the architect also designs its roof, its doors and windows, so that from the viewpoint of the workers 
the architect has designed many things, but from the architect’s point of view he has produced 
chiefly one thing, with a plurality of coordinated parts52. We can agree with George, but pointing out 
the fact that his argument actually holds for the proximate moving cause, and not for the first 
unmovable mover. In my view, the strongest objection to George’s arguments remains that, if in 
the first cause of all things formal and moving principle were to be identical, the first cause would 
be the form of things, which would seriously contrast with the immanence of the Aristotelian form.   
This point is also raised in George’s own interpretation of our passage. Indeed, he recalls 
Brentano’s interpretation of the passage, according to which the sentence becomes: 
 
(a) Besides these, [i.e. besides medical art being health, etc.], there is the way in which that 
which is the first moving principle among all is all things53. 
 
Such a lecture implies that in the first mover formal cause coincides with moving cause, from which 
it follows that the unmoved mover knows the world, at least in the sense of nomological 
knowledge. George asserts that from (a) follows: 
 
(b) Besides these, [i.e., besides medical art, building art and man], there is that which as first of 
all things moves all things, 
 
                                                          
51 Cf. Averroës, Tafsīr, 1529. 
52 Cf. George, “An Argument for Divine Omniscience in Aristotle”, 67-69. 
53 Brentano, Die Psychologie des Aristoteles, 190: «[…] hiezu kommt noch die Weise, in welcher das, was 
unter allen das erste bewegende Princip ist, Alles ist».  
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and that another reading results from taking back Bonitz’s change: 
 
(c) Besides these, [i.e., besides medical art being health, the building art being the house and 
man begetting man], there is the way in which the first of all things moves all things. 
 
According to George, (b) and (c) imply, although not in an explicit way, that the first of all things 
contains within itself the formal principle of what it brings forth, in the same way as medical art, 
architecture, and man54. However, such a lecture, which requires a narrower reference of ταῦτα 
and does not consider the final passage as linked to all the chapter, but only to the previous 
sentence, reaches a conclusion which is precisely what Aristotle, on the other hand, seems to 
deny. 
Crubellier notes that in Λ 5 Aristotle refers to ‘the sun and the oblique circle’ in the same 
position and with the same expression, mentioning the external cause as a further (ἔτι) principle, 
after the immanent causes55. Hence he observes that if, at the end of Λ 4, Aristotle only needed an 
example of a moving cause which is ‘not of the same form’, he could have recalled the sun, and he 
adds that perhaps Aristotle could have felt that it was important, at the end of the discussion on 
elements and causes, to underline that the first cause of all things was a moving cause an not an 
element56. However Crubellier recognizes that Aristotle distinguishes the unmoved mover from 
other causes by saying that the first moving cause does not have the form of its product as, 
conversely, does happen in the case of the ordinary moving cause. In my view, this is exactly the 
point. The first introduction of the unmoved mover in book Λ appears to refer to the second kind of 
moving cause, i.e. the remote first cause. This kind of moving cause, unlike the proximate moving 
cause, does not coincide with the form of its effects. So in 1070 b 34 it appears plausible that the 
term ἔτι introduces a sentence which is not completely independent from the rest of the chapter, 
and with the term ταῦτα, Aristotle is referring to the immanent principles and to the moving cause in 
                                                          
54 Cf. George, “An Argument for Divine Omniscience in Aristotle”, 66. 
55 Aristot. Metaph. Λ 5, 1071 a 13-17: […] ἀνθρώπου αἴτιον τά τε στοιχεῖα, πῦρ καὶ γῆ ὡς ὕλη καὶ τὸ ἴδιον 
εἶδος, καὶ ἔτι τι ἄλλο ἔξω οἷον ὁ πατήρ, καὶ παρὰ ταῦτα ὁ ἥλιος καὶ ὁ λοξὸς κύκλος, οὔτε ὕλη ὄντα οὔτ’ εἶδος 
οὔτε στέρησις οὔτε ὁμοειδὲς ἀλλὰ κινοῦντα.  
56 Cf. Crubellier, “Metaphysics Λ 4”, 158-159. 
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the weaker sense. Therefore, the meaning of the sentence appears to be that, in addition to the 
causes explicitly mentioned above, i.e. the immanent principle and the external cause in the 
weaker sense, there is the first and remote moving cause, which moves all things. For the first 
mover of all things, the identity of  moving cause and form does not work, and therefore it does not 
belong to physics. 
In conclusion, in the final passage of Λ 4 Aristotle distinguishes the remote moving cause 
from the proximate moving cause. They are both common principles, but in the first case the 
coincidence between formal and efficient cause does not occur. The impossibility for god to be the 
formal cause of beings, is given by its being separated from his effects. If we admit that god is a 
formal cause, then we attribute a characteristic to him which belongs to the Platonic tradition, and 
that is actually the element which most distinguishes it from the Aristotelian philosophical system. 
Plato’s Idea is a separate formal cause of substances, a παράδειγμα; Aristotle’s god is not the 
παράδειγμα of substances; in fact, he is not their form as he is separate from them. According to 
Aristotle his effects don’t possess any common character with god. This means that divine thought 
is not part of what Aristotle says with regards to the moving cause in the weaker sense, which 
implies that the moving cause knows the form of its products. Therefore the mention of the 
unmoved mover in Λ 4 is not detached from the rest of the chapter; on the contrary, it fits in totally 
and is completely in agreement with Λ 9, telling us that the first unmoved mover does not know the 
world. 
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